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THE CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW
CONTRACTS TO MAKE WILLS
WILLIAM M. JAMES
In recent years there has been an in-
creasing amount of litigation arising out
of agreements to make wills. As a con-
sequence the lawyer of today, who is han-
dling probate work, must acquaint himself
with these agreements, their validity and
enforcability.
It is not intended that this article shall
constitute a brief on this subject but rather
it shall be the purpose of the writer to
discuss several of the more important legal
aspects of this type of agreement.
EXAMPLES OF HOW THESE CON-
TRACTS ARISE
In order to get a clearer understanding
of the various phases of this question, it
would seem advisable at the outset to
examine the circumstances which most
frequently give rise to these agreements.
Among the more familiar examples is the
case where a certain person has given his
property to another, the donee to have the
use of the principal and income arising
therefrom during his life and to make a
will devising all of the property which he
may have at his death back to the original
donor. For instance suppose a husband
dies leaving a will in which he bequeaths
his property to his wife and children. One
of the children then desiring that his
mother shall have the use of the income
and principal of his father's estate, which
is devised to him, gives the 'property so
received by him from his father to his
mother, and in consideration of this gift
to her, the mother agrees to make a will
leaving all the property she may own at
the time of her death, to the son, who
made the transfer to her.
A second example is where two persons
each agree to make a will in favor of the
other with the understanding that the
survivor shall take all.
A third case is where a promisor agrees
to devise or bequeath his estate or a
stipulated portion of it to a person in con-
sideration of such person rendering serv-
ices to the promisor for a certain stipulated
time or for the remainder of the promisor's
life.
A fourth example is where one trans-
fers his property to another, the trans-
feree agreeing to support the donor as
long as the donor shall live, and to leave
a will devising the property transferred
back to the donor in the event the donor
survives the donee.
Then again an agreement of this type
may also arise out of a "ante-nuptial agree-
ment" whereby a man agrees with a
woman that if she will marry him, he will
devise and bequeath to her a stipulated
sum in excess of the amount which she
would be entitled to receive as his widow
in the event she survives him.
Post-nuptial agreements may also give
rise to a contract to make a will. For
instance, a husband in consideration of
his wife releasing her right of dower in
and to his real estate may agree with her
that he will devise and bequeath to her
certain stipulated property in excess of
what she would be entitled to receive
were she to survive him. The foregoing
examples are a few of the more common
ones which give rise to an agreement to
make wills. It is, of course, conceivable
that these agreements could arise in many
other ways.
PRE-REQUISITES TO VALIDITY
When the first effort was made to en-
force agreements of this type it was con-
tended that they were contrary to public
policy and therefore void. It has, however,
been so universally held that these con-
tracts are not contrary to public policy
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that it would seem unnecessary to refer to
any decisions on this point. In order for
an agreement of this type to be valid,
there are, however, certain requisites
which must be complied with.
In the first place the parties to the
agreement must be possesed of the ca-
pacity to contract. This principal was
discussed in Howe vs. Watson et al 179
Mass., p. 30. In this case the person who
had agreed to make a will leaving her
property to the plaintiff was at the time
of making the agreement eighty-five years
of age and in poor health. The testimony
showed that at the time she wrote the
letter which constituted the agreement,
she was dressed and sitting up and ap-
peared to be in her right mind, which
seemed as clear as it had ever been. There
was some conflicting testimony by the
attending physician that the mental facul-
ties of the deceased were impaired to a
great extent. This testimony was cor-
roborated in some degree by the nurse of
the deceased. Nevertheless, it was held
that the evidence taken as a whole was
sufficient to support a finding by the Mas-
ter that the deceased was of sound mind
at the time she made the agreement, and,
therefore, had the capacity to contract.
This case illustrates the principal that the
parties to an agreement to make a will
like the parties to any other contract must
have the capacity to contract. Such a
conract in order to be inforcible must
also be fair and equitable. This rule was
adhered to by the court in Hanly v.
Hanly, 105 N. Y. App. Div. 335 in which
case the court said that before an agree-
ment of this type will be enforced it must
be fair and equitable in its terms. This
precise language was also used by the
Court of Appeals of N. Y. in Hamlin vs.
Stevens, 69 N. E. 118, and several other
well-considered cases.
In common with other contracts an
agreement to make a will in order to be
binding must also be mutually accepted by
the parties thereto. This principal is well
illustrated in Rose vs. Oliver, et al, 32
Oregon 337. This was a suit filed by the
plaintiff, to require the heirs of the de-
ceased to specifically perform a certain
contract alleged to have been entered into
between the plaintiff and the deceased,
whereby the deceased agreed to make a
will devising and bequeathing all his
property at the date of his death to the
plaintiff, to the exclusion of the other
heirs at law, The testimony in the case
showed that the proposed devisee may
have voluntarily substantially complied
with the terms of the alleged agreement,
but that he was not in fact under any
obligation or understanding to meet the
offer and proposal or the alleged promise
of the deceased. The court in its opinion
pointed out that "a proposition that cer-
tain property shall be devised to another
in consideration of certain services to be
performed for the devisor during his life
is not binding, and specific performance
cannot be enforced where there is no
acknowledgment of its terms showing a
mutual agreement thereto although the
proposed devisee may have voluntarily
substantially complied with the terms
thereof." In other -words, whatever is to
be done by the promisee must be pursu-
ant to the terms of the agreement, with
knowledge by both parties that the prom-
isee is electing to be bound by the agree-
ment and is endeavoring to fulfill his part
of it.
A contract of this type must, of course,
be supported by a valid consideration.
This consideration, however, may be in a
variety of forms. For example, in the
case of Evans vs. Moore, 247 Ill. P. 60,
the court held that an agreement by a
land owner to devise his property to his
nephew if the latter would leave his par-
ents and relatives, renounce allegiance to
his country and come to the United States
to live and become a citizen thereof was
founded upon a valuable consideration,
and would be enforced if the contract had
been complied with by the promissee. In
the case of Oswald vs. Nehls, et al, 233 Ill.
438, the consideration was in the form of
services to be rendered by the proposed
devisee and was held sufficient to support
an agreement to make a will. These are
only a few of the many types of consider-
ation which will support these agree-
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ments. It is also necessary that a con-
tract to make a will be certain and defi-
nite in its terms. This is particularly true
where it is sought to enforce a contract to
make a will where such contract is con-
trary to the statute of frauds. 'In Smith
vs. Smith, 5 Bush, Ky. 625, the plaintiff
sought to enforce a written contract
which contained the following provision:
"It being the express agreement and un-
derstanding between the parties hereto
that on a final distribution of his estate,
the said Peter Smith intends to make the
aforesaid children, who represent their
father, the said Noah Smith, equal in all
things with his son." It was contended
by the defendants that these words im-
posed no obligation on the deceased and
constituted a mere expression of his feel-
ings and purposes at the time he signed
the agreement and were merely explana-
tory of the motives which induced him to
enter into the agreement. The court held
that the foregoing portion of the contract,
together with other words contained in the
contract were sufficiently definite to con-
stitute an obligation on the part of the
promisor to make the children of Noah
Smith equal with his son L. C. Smith in
the distribution of the promisor's estate.
In Brandes vs. Brandes, et al, 129 Ia., p.
351, two of the cross petitioners alleged
that the deceased, who was their grand-
father, because of certain matters, had
agreed to make provision for them in his
will and that certain land devised to them
by the deceased was in pursuance of such
agreement and therefore that the widow's
dower should be set apart for her from
other property owned by the deceased at
his death. The evidence adduced in sup-
port of these allegations showed that the
testator had merely remarked that he
would remember them but did not indi-
cate how nor the particular consideration
for which this should be done. The court
in refusing to enforce the claim of the
cross-petitioners pointed out that the al-
leged contract between them and the de-
ceased was entirely too indefinite to en-
title them to the relief prayed for. On
the other hand in the same case a second
agreement by the deceased to make a
will was alleged. It was contended that
in this agreement the deceased and his
wife, then residing in their home on Lots
10 and 11, proposed to the promisee that
if she would move there with her family
and take care of them in their old age,
she should have said lots 10 and 11 and
also lot 12 after their death; that she ac-
cepted the proposition and fully performed
her part of the agreement. The agree-
ment as alleged was substantialy proved
and the court held that it was sufficiently
definite and certain in its terms to justify
the court in enforcing it. This case is
particularly interesting because of the fact
that two different agreements are so-ught
to be enforced, one of which is held un-
inforcible because it is not sufficiently cer-
tain and definite in its terms, and the
other of which was enforced because it
was sufficiently certain and definite *n its
terms. But not only must there be a
certainty as to the property to be devised
but the contract must also be certain as
to the promisee. In the case of Howe vs.
Wilson, et al, 179 Mass., p. 30, hereinbe-
fore referred to, the contract of the de-
cedant 'was in the form of a letter to her
"sister Ellen" in which she offers to leave
her property to the latter on certain con-
ditions. The Court held that the words
"sister Ellen" constitute a sufficient de-
scription of the promisee to constitute a
valid contract, it appearing from the evi-
dence that the deceased had only one sis-
ter named "Ellen." Also in connection
with the degree of certainty required with
respect to the property to be devised or
bequeathed the court held in this same
case that a contract to leave all the prop-
erty that one party thereto may own at
her death to the other party contains a
sufficient description of the property.
It must further appear that the contract
is free from fraud, undue influence and is
not unconscionahle. This principal was
recognized in Jenkins vs. Stetson, 9 Allen
Mass. 128.
Furthermore, it would seem that if the
contract is in parol, a higher degree of
proof is required. As was said in Hamlin
vs. Stevens, 177 N. Y. 39, "Contracts to
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make wills should be in writing, and the
writing should be produced, or, if ever
based upon parol evidence, it should be
given or corroborated in all substantial
particulars by disinterested witnesses.
Unless such contracts are established
clearly by satisfactory proofs, and are
equitable, specific performance should not
be decreed." The application of the stat-
ute of frauds to contracts of this character
will be discussed later.
PERFORMANCE
Having now determined that contracts
of this type will be enforced and also hav-
ing briefly discussed several of the re-
quisites of such contracts, let us see what
constitutes a performance on the part of
the promisor. In other words, if the
promisor were to devise property of less
value or were to devise a smaller estate
or were to devise property and place a:
condition upon the devise when the agree-
ment was for an absolute and uncondi-
tional bequest, would the contract then be
sufficiently performed? These points have
been discussed in a number of cases. In
Phalen vs. United States Trust Co., 186
N. Y. 178, it was held that a devise of
property of less value than originally
agreed upon did not constitute a sufficient
performance. Again in Parrott, et al, vs.
Gaves' Ex'x, 32 S. 605, the court pointed
out that a devise of a smaller estate than
agreed upon was not a sufficient perform-
ance and in Crofoot vs. Layton, et al,
68 Conn., p. 91, the Court very ably
pointed out that a devise or bequest upon
condition would not amount to a sufficient
performance of an agreement where the
agreement called for an absolute and un-
conditional bequest or devise.
WHEN BREACH OCCURS
As a general proposition it can safely
be said that a breach of a contract of this
type does not occur before the death of
the promisor. Nor can there be a breach
under certain circumstances. For exam-
ple, it was held in 9 C. B. 1 by the Court
of Common Pleas that where performance
becomes impossible as by the death of the
promisor during the life of the testator
the agreement becomes uninforcible. Per-
formance may also be excused as where
there is an abandonment by mutual con-
sent as was the case in 78 Ill. 127 pro-
vided, however, that the abandonment by
the promisor has not been condoned by
the testator as was the case in Burns vs.
Smith, et al, 21 Montana 251. In con-
nection with the breach of a contract of
this type the question frequently arises,
what is the effect of a conveyance before
death of a third person? A distinction is
made where the agreement is to make a
particular disposition of property and
v here the agreement merely covers the
property which the promisor may leave
by will. In Evans vs. Moore, et at, 247
Ill. P. 60, the Court pointed out that
where a land owner agreed to devise his
property to his nephew and the agree-
ment was based upon a valid considera-
tion and there was performance of the
conditions by the nephew, he would be
entitled to have the agreement carried out
as against a voluntary grantee or devisee
of the promisor, there being no question
of the rights of bona fide purchasers in-
volved. On the other hand in Austin vs.
Davis, et al, 128 Ind. 472, where the
agreement was to leave to the promisee
whatever property the promisor may
leave by will, it was held that the prom-
isor retained all right of disposition
thereof during his life and a voluntary
gift of it to his wife not made with intent
to defraud the promisee passes title there-
to free from all charges arising out of his
contract with the promisee.
A CAUSE OF ACTION ACCRUES
While the breach of an agreement to
make a will does not ordinarily occur be--
fore the death of the promisor, it is pos-
sible for such an agreement to be repu-
diated by the promisor in his lifetime, in
which event 'a cause of action accrues for
relief by way of recission or recovery of
damages. He cannot, however, bring an
action to specifically enforce the agree-
ment until the death of the promisor. In
Chantland vs. Sherman 148 Iowa 352
these precise principles were discussed,
and the court said "an agreement to niake
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a will may not be specifically enforced
until the death of the party agreeing to
execute the will, but upon repudiation of
such agreement by denying its existence,
or by disposing of the property to be
willed, a cause of action may accrue for
the enforcement of the agreement through
an analogous relief, recission, or the re-
covery of damages. Otherwise perform-
ance might be defeated by rendering this
impossible by the disposition of the prop-
erty or through inability to prove the con-
tract after the death of the promisor."
In Carmichael vs. Carmichael 72 Mich.
76, a conveyance to a third person was set
aside and a decree directed to be entered
such as would prevent the party promis-
ing to make the will from violating the
agreement. In Duvale vs. Duvale 54 N.
J. Equity 581, a wife, who, on ample con-
sideration, had promised to execute a will
of certain property to her husband, re-
pudiated the agreement and in a suit to
protect the husband's rights the vice
chancellor said, "While it is true that a
promise to make a certain will is not brok-
en until the death of the promisor and
it is true that actions in which such prom-
ises have been enforced have been in
cases occurring after the death of the
promisor, yet I do not see why the court
cannot, upon the principle of quia timet, fix
upon the property a liability to answer
the promise, in any case where the prom-
isor has, during life, repudiated its
terms, and attempted to make other dis-
position of the property." Also in Van-
duyne vs. Breeland, 12 N. J. Equity, 142,
the chancellor recognized the right of the
promisee to protection upon the principle
of quia timet.
METHODS OF ENFORCEMENT
Where there has been a breach of an
agreement to make a will the question
immediately arises, how shall the prom-
isee seek to enforce the agreement? Sev-
eral methods may be resorted to, depend-
ing on the nature of the property to be
willed, the terms of the contract and
whether or not it was in parol only.
Where the agreement was to devise real
estate the most common method is by
filing a bill in equity whereby the prom-
isee seeks to impress the real estate with
a trust and prays specific performance of
the agreement. That equity has the power
to decree specific performance of such an
agreement can hardly be questioned in
view of the numerous decisions through-
-out the United States holding that such a
right exists in a court of chancery. As
was pointed out in Edwards vs. Brown
et al 308 Ill. P. 350, "Contracts to devise
or convey real estate will be enforced in
courts of equity by specific performance
on the ground that the law will not do
perfect and complete justice." Agreements
to make wills have in proper cases been
held enforcible in actions at law as well
as in equity. For example in the case of
Frost vs. Tarr 53 Ind. 390, the court held
that an action at law for damages will lie
for the violation of an agreement to make
a will against the personal representative
of the promisor, and in such case the
damages may be measured by the value of
the portion promised and the plaintiff will
not be limited to the value of the services
rendered by him as the consideration for
the agreement. Also it has been held that
where the agreement on the part of the
promisee Is to render services to the'
promisor, an action can be maintained on
the common counts to recover the value
of the service rendered. This method of
enforcement was permitted in Ginders vs.
Ginders 21 Ill. App. 522. In this case the
court used the following language, "If the
services of the promisee were rendered
under an agreement with the deceased,
that she would remain with and work
for him during his lifetime, and that he
would provide her a home and support
upon his death and he did not do so, then
the promisee may recover of his admin-
istrator as upon a Quantum meruit." It
has also been held that such an agreement
may be enforced by filing a claim against
the decedents' estate. This method of
enforcing the contract was used in n
Mallory's estate 35 N. Y. Supp. 155. In
this case it was held that where the
claimant furnished board to deceased
under an agreement that he should receive
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therefor whatever site had left at her
death, tile full autount therefor should be
allowed, without regard to the value of
the services. it has also been hcld that
where a party to au agrentent to make a
will, void because of the statute of
frauds, fails to perform his contract,'the
other party may recover hack the aumount
paid in under the contract though the
contract be a nullity aud no action can
be maintained upon it. This rule was ap-
plied in the case of Smith vs. Smith 28
N. J. Law 1'. 208. There a son of the
promisor occupied the farm, which was
owned by his father, as tenant from year
to year. The son erected buildings upon
the land with the consent and approba-
tion of the father and upon the parol
promise of the latter that he should have
the farm, either by deed or devise, on the
death of the father. This contract was
held to l)e void because of the statute of
frauds. But the court held that the son
was entitled to recover front the estate of
his father the value of the improvements
placed upon the land.
EVIDENCE ADMISSABLE
Whenever it is sought to efiforce an
agreement to make a will the question
necessarily arises can the plaintiff testify
in his or her own behalf as to transactions
or conversations with the deceased before
his death. Naturally the capacity of the
plaintiff to testify must necessarily depend
largely upon the statutes in the different
jurisdictions. A good illustration of this
is found i, Showers vs. Warwick 152 Il.
356 Illinois, where the Stipreme Court in
construing the Evidence Act in Illinois
held that the complainant in a suit against
the heirs and devisees to enforce the spe-
cific performance of a verbal agreement to
convey land is not nor is her husband a
competent witness but in Oswald vs.
Nehls et al 233 II1. 438 the court held
that the complainant could testify in her
own behalf as to performance of the con-
tract in so far as it effects the land which
the children hold as voluntary grantees
even though as to the land they hold as
heirs she is not competent to testify. Re-
gardless, however, of what testimony may
be admitted by the court. the same will be
carefully scrutinized. As was stated in
Garren vs. Shook 306 I11. 154, "Courts of
equity look with jealousy upon evidence
offered in support of a contract to make a
disposition of the property of a deceased
person different from that provided by
law and will weigh such evidence in the
most scrupulous nanner." The court
further stated that "the proof which will
justify a court of equity in decreeing the
specific performance of a contract for a
coulvcyance, the existence of which de-
Ietlds tipon parol testimony must be clear
and conclusive and there must be no rea-
sonable doubt that the contract was made
and that all its terms have been clearly
proven.
APPLICATION OF STATUTE OF
FRAUDS
The defense most frequently asserted
by the defendants to actions brought to
enforce agreements to make wills is tihe
Statute of Frauds. There are three sec-
tions of the Statute of Frauds which the
defendants have at one time or alt,ther
sought to apply to these cases. The ,mine
most commonly interposed is that portimi
of the statute which 1)ro)vides in substance
that "no action shall be brought to charge
any persont upon any contract for the .,de
of lands unless the contract be in writ-
ing.- There can be no doubt that par,,l
contracts to devise real estate fall within
this portion of the statute. However. aut
exception has been made to this rule in
many jurisdictions. For example itt the ca.
of Mayo vs. Mayo 302 III. 1'. 584 the
court said. "The statute of frauds is d.-
signed to prevent frattd and it cannot be
invoked to prevent the enforcement of a
protnise to convey land itt return for serv-
ices rendered where failure to enforce tile
contract will amount to a fraud tipon tile
promisee." In Horton vs. .Stegmyer 175
Federal 756, the court stated the excellii ,i
even more broadly. The coutrt said, "it i,
that part l)erformance of sucl anm agrev.-
ntelit by delivery of imssession of lin
property to the pro| osed devise( or hy
other similar acts which are tnavo)idalil v
referable to the contract, which will tak:
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it out of the statute, as they will other
parol contracts to sell land." The court
further said, "And there are cases in
which long and patient service in reli-
ance upon such a contract have been held
to constitute such a part performance as
would render inforceable the agreement,"
citing Stone vs. Todd 49 N. J. Law 274.
However, in this connection the court
further called attention to the fact that
"The part performance which will with-
draw such a contract from the ban of the
statute must consist of an act or of acts
which it clearly appears that the perform-
ing parties would not have done in the ab-
sence of the agreement or without a di-
rect view to its performance." It has been
further urged that the section of the stat-
ute which requires that "a contract not to
be performed within a year from the mak-
ing thereof" must be in writing applies to
agreements to make wills. This conten-
tion has been held untenable, however,
upon the theory that the contract may be-
come capable of being performed by the
parties within a year. In the case entitled
Story et al vs. Story et al 61 S. W. 279
the court overruled the contention that
this section of the statutes of frauds ap-'
plied and stated "Where a contract de-
pends upon an event that may happen
within a year, it is not within the statute
of frauds, although the parties may in
fact contemplate that the contract will
probably extend over a considerable length
of time." The next section of the Statute
of Frauds which it has been claimed ap-
plies to contracts to make wills is that
portion of the statute which provides
that "contracts to sell personal property
in excess of a certain value shall not be
enforcible unless some note or memoran-
dum in writing of the contract or sale be
signed by the party to be charged or his
agent in that behalf." Where the agree-
ment is to bequeath personal property in
excess of the amount provided for in the
statute and the agreement is not in writ-
ing it may fall within this section unless
there has been such part performance as
to take it out of the statute. If, however,
we are to disregard this section of the
Statute of Frauds and hold that it has no
application to an agreement to make a
will, then it may become necessary to de-
termine what is the effect of the section
of the statute relating to the sale of real
estate where the agreement is not only to
devise real estate but to bequeath personal
property. It has been held that where
the contract is to devise real estate and
bequeath personal property it is wholly
within this section of the statute if it
is indevisable. At least it can safely he
said that a parol contract to devise and
bequeath real and personal property is
void as to the real estate in the absence
of partial performance or some other act
taking the contract out of the statute of
frauds.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The question has arisen in a number of
cases as to when the statute of limitations
commences to run. This point was
passed upon by the court of appeals of
Kentucky in Story vs. Story 61 S. \V.
279. In this case the court held that a
cause of action did not accrue upon a con-
tract to make provision for another by
will until the death of the promisor and
the statute of limitations does not begin
to run until that time. Where, however,
a suit is based upon a quantum meruit to
recover for the value of the service ren-
dered and the Statute of Limitations is
pleaded in defense it has been held that
the plaintiff can only recover for his serv-
ices for the time allowed for bringing suit
next before presenting his claim, and in
Illinois it was held that in computing the
time, there must be deducted the time that
elapsed between the death of the promisor
and the clay fixed by the administrators of
his estate for the adjustment of claims
against the estate. This rule was followed
by the Illinois Supreme Court in Freeman
vs. Freeman 65 Ill. 106. The Statute of
Limitations in Illinois being five years at
the time this action was brought.
Also where there has been an unequiv-
ocal repudiation of the contract in the life-
time of the promisor it has been stated
that the Statute of Limitations will com-
mence to run from the date of. such re-
pudiation.
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